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Climate and trade policies: from mutual
destruction to mutual support
PATRICK A. MESSERL IN*
Groupe d’Economie Mondiale at Sciences Po, France.
Abstract: There is no doubt that trade and climate policies can be mutually
destructive. But there are three strong reasons to suggest that they can also be
mutually supportive: they have a common problem, common foes, and common
friends. Mutual support would be much stronger if the world regimes for these
two policies shared a few common principles. The climate community should feel
at ease with the broad WTO principles of ‘national treatment’ and ‘most-favoured
nation’, and rely on them in building its own treaty and institutions. The trade
community should grasp the opportunity to beneﬁt from the better disciplines on
adjustment policies that it is hoped the climate community will design.
These conclusions should put the many pending problems into a more positive
perspective, and persuade negotiators to ﬁnd pragmatic compromises, as was the
case with the GATT. Using this perspective, the paper focuses on a few key issues,
such as the deﬁnition of carbon border taxes and the reasons to ban carbon tariffs.
Other cases of mutual support are examined. For instance, the climate community
should not repeat the mistakes of the world trade regime in dealing with the
developing and least developed countries.
Introduction
A decade ago, the relations between the climate and trade communities were
marked by mutual ignorance at best, and more often by (deep) hostility when deal-
ing with the issue of carbon emissions, on which this paper focuses.1 The climate
community did not want to be hindered in any way by constraints on trade policy.
The trade community was so afraid of the damage that climate policies could do to
the world trade regime that it was adamantly opposed to any consideration of such
concerns. Mutual destruction looked inevitable.
This negative phase has begun to give way to more positive attitudes on both
sides, as illustrated by the recent literature (Charnovitz, 2003; Pauwelyn, 2007;
* Email: patrick.messerlin@sciences-po.fr
1 By contrast, there have been numerous discussions and potential agreements on broader
environmental issues (such as tariff cuts on environmental goods and services) between these two
communities.
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WTO, 2007; Houser et al., 2008; Antholis, 2009; Hufbauer et al., 2009;
Kommerskollegium, 2009; Horn and Mavroidis, 2010; Hufbauer and Kim,
2010; Low et al., 2010). However, this literature focuses on the existing trade
rules as they could be interpreted. Such a precautionary approach makes sense to
the extent that relevant trade provisions are often written in a general language not
yet tested by robust case law. But it is inevitably biased towards a systematic
magniﬁcation of the scope of conﬂict since it examines the many possible conﬂicts
raised by creative trade lawyers, while it underestimates the ﬂexibility of the world
trade regime (the main exceptions being Hufbauer et al., 2009 and Hufbauer and
Kim, 2010).
Meanwhile, the 2009 Copenhagen Conference has amply shown that climate
negotiators from all countries keep a close eye on their trade interests since trade
has become such a substantial share of the economic activity of almost all the
countries in the world. This is very different from the situation prevailing in 1997 at
the time of the signature of the Kyoto Protocol: then, developing countries were still
a small part of global emissions and of global trade as well. By contrast, emerging
economies made it clear in Copenhagen (which looks very much like the 1999
WTO Seattle Ministerial) that they do not want to make ﬁrm commitments on
cutting emissions if they are not reassured about the way their exports to the devel-
oped countries will be treated in the future. And developed countries do not want to
make ﬁrm commitments on cutting emissions if they are not reassured about the
way their imports from developing countries could be treated in the future.
Tackling the trade dimension of the world climate regime is thus a necessary
condition for a robust treaty on climate. Moreover, it is a key input in solving the
other essential political condition for an agreement on climate: how the efforts to
cope with emissions ‘inherited’ from past industrialization should be shared
between developed and developing countries.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 develops the following basic
proposition. The climate and trade communities have much more in common than
might be perceived at ﬁrst glance. Hence, they have many reasons and oppor-
tunities to serve as a buttress to each other. Sixty years ago, the world trade regime
had to solve the very problems the climate community faces today. It would be very
unfortunate if the trade community did not share its experience with the climate
community. At the same time, the climate community could help the trade
community to rectify some of the errors it made 60 years ago when it designed the
world trade regime. In short, there are ‘two-way’ beneﬁts. Mutual support is highly
desirable.
Sections 2 to 4 examine in detail a number of instruments – important from a
trade perspective – that could be introduced into an international climate regime.
Since these sections focus on international negotiations, they look for compromises
suitable for all countries. Such compromises rarely end up with transparent notions
and texts, as is best illustrated by the text of the General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs (GATT), the ambiguity of which has been underlined by many observers
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(for instance Dam, 1970). Section 2 focuses on carbon border taxes. If the intro-
duction of such taxes is felt necessary for a successful outcome of the international
negotiations on a climate regime, a great deal of attention should be paid to their
precise deﬁnition; alternative deﬁnitions have signiﬁcantly different impacts.
Section 3 shifts to carbon tariffs, a concept radically different from carbon border
taxes (though generally treated as similar by policy makers, negotiators, and
observers); indeed, it argues that carbon tariffs should be avoided at any cost from
both a trade and a climate perspective. Section 4 turns to a third instrument –
carbon conditional measures (hereafter CCMs) – and it argues that they should
also be avoided at any cost from both a trade and a climate perspective. The section
also explains the gains the world climate regime could offer the trade regime if it
succeeds in deﬁning sound adjustment measures, a point the trade regime has failed
to address properly so far. A ﬁnal section concludes.
1. Common problem, common foes, common friends
The climate community has been disappointed, to say the least, by the outcome of
the 2009 Copenhagen Conference. It could get some comfort – and, more impor-
tantly, some insights on what to do – by looking at how the world trade regime was
established 60 years ago.
The La Havana Conference was convened in 1948 in order to design an
ambitious treaty for the world trading system. The complete failure of the
conference left distressed negotiators with a few provisions with limited scope (the
so-called General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) and a series of commitments on
tariff cuts that had already been negotiated and agreed in 1947, but without a wide
legal framework to enforce them.2 As a result, the GATT and the commitments on
tariff cuts entered into force under a ‘protocol of provisional application’, which
was not a treaty, which was initially signed by only 19 countries, and which did not
include the many substantive chapters of the defunct Havana Charter, such as
those on economic development or on business practices. In many respects, the
GATT was (still is) a ‘political’ text dominated by good intentions and by loose
language dubbed ‘creative ambiguity’.
This short history of the birth of GATT/WTO is so similar to what happened
with the 2009 Copenhagen Conference that it raises the following questions. Is
there a common problem lying behind such a parallel? Have the climate and trade
communities the same foes and friends? What is the value of multilateralism in a
climate context?
2 This paper uses the acronym GATT for the text of the Agreement, and the acronym GATT/WTO for
the institutions in charge of monitoring its implementation and of hosting multilateral trade negotiations
(‘Rounds’).
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Common problem
The climate and trade communities face the same basic problem: they deal with a
‘public good’ at the world level. Climate is a public good: countries unwilling to
contribute to a climate policy can undermine the results of those making efforts.
Freer trade is a public good: its beneﬁts are greater and faster to emerge if all
countries move together. These similar basic problems require a similar solution: an
adequate multilateral regime.
However, the history of GATT/WTO shows that while a multilateral regime
‘enhances’ national decisions, unilateral policies by individual countries are needed
to initiate the process and to keep it rolling.3 This is because, despite robust
economic analysis, most countries continue to believe that they would be better off
imposing tariffs on their imports while getting free access to the markets of the rest
of the world. In such a context, countries moving ahead of the others – for instance,
Britain in the early 1800s or the United States in the mid-1900s – have shown
critical leadership in making the provision of a ‘public good’ easier (a luxury that
has not happened so far in the climate domain).4 During the past two to three
decades, 60% of trade liberalization has been through unilateral decisions made by
national governments, with these decisions being (partly) consolidated later in the
world trade regime (World Bank, 2005; Martin and Messerlin, 2007).
The emerging world climate regime seems to be following the same pattern. The
annexes to the Copenhagen Accord rely entirely on unilateral climate commit-
ments. Unilateral movers in climate matters will also be needed because a similar
scepticism exists in this domain: most countries believe (correctly in this case) that
they could escape most of the effects of climate change if the others took appro-
priate measures to ﬁght climate change, while avoiding taking measures themselves.
That said, the public good aspects of climate and trade are not valued in exactly
similar ways. If freer trade is implemented in an economically sound way (that is,
with the appropriate complementary domestic policies), it is a powerful policy for
growth and poverty reduction. It is thus an attractive option for countries wanting
to catch up (poor countries) and a less attractive option for countries that feel their
existing supremacy challenged (rich countries). The converse applies to climate.
Concern about climate depends on income level, and poor countries tend to value
3 This is not a new phenomenon. In trade, Britain started in the 1840s, followed by France in 1860.
Indeed, the 1860 Franco-British Treaty triggered a complex web of bilateral treaties that echoes the
polycentric approach envisaged by Ostrom (2009) in the climate context. However, the nineteenth-century
trade regime collapsed largely because countries were unable to ‘structure’ all these agreements, for
instance by adopting the principle of the most favoured nation (Tumlir, 1983). This explains the focus of
the founding fathers of the GATT/WTO on a multilateral agreement, though they were friendly to regional
trade agreements (as shown by GATT Article XXIV). It will be interesting to see whether this complex
dynamic of the world trade regime over two centuries will occur in the future world climate regime.
4 Leading countries (the United States in particular) have been instrumental in launching the long and
difﬁcult trade Rounds which have allowed progress towards freer world trade in the rest of the world.
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climate policies less highly than rich countries. The corollary is that a world climate
regime that hurts the trade interests of the poor countries runs a high risk of being
rejected, as was amply shown during the Copenhagen Conference.
There is thus a need to deﬁne efﬁcient climate policies that do not hurt trade, and
hence growth perspectives.5 In particular, a climate agenda pushed too far may
generate a dual world system where developed countries trade among themselves,
using carbon efﬁcient technologies, while developing countries further integrate
among themselves with ‘dirty’ technologies. This is a perspective that is equally
dark for trade policy and climate policy, increasingly so as emerging markets
become bigger and bigger.
Common foes: already there
The trade and climate communities also face the same foes. These are mostly vested
industrial interests in carbon-intensive activities (aluminium, cement, chemicals,
glass, paper, and steel, to name the most important), although the situation is more
nuanced than often described. Such vested interests may try to use trade protection
as a way to oppose or to slow down changes on the climate front, and to use the
climate argument to keep their existing trade protection.
As the trade community has faced similar problems during the last six decades, it
is very well aware of the capacity of vested interests to capture and reshape policies
to the detriment of the whole country’s interests. By contrast, some members of the
climate community seem ready to follow those vested interests, hoping that climate
policy will beneﬁt from such a coalition. Section 4 argues that this is unlikely to be
the case and provides robust evidence on these common foes.
Common friends: emerging
A crucial strength of the world trade regime has been its capacity to mobilize
‘positive’ economic forces against the vested interests mentioned above. These
forces are pushing for opening of markets because they are conﬁdent they can
deliver better products and/or charge cheaper prices. Mobilization of this sort is
relatively easy in a context of cutting tariffs (cutting taxes is always popular for
exporters and consumers), all the more so because the trade community has been
lucky enough to know what level of tariff maximizes economic welfare – zero
(completely free trade).6
5Growth and climate are often perceived as antagonistic. However, there is a vast literature showing
that their interactions are much more complex, with growth-related trade having a scale effect (generally
negative on climate), a composition effect (ambiguous), and a technological effect (generally positive on
climate).
6 Economic analysis shows that positive tariffs could increase the welfare of ‘large’ countries, or where
there is ‘imperfect’ competition. However, these arguments are less strong for the coming decades.
Emerging large economies quickly erode the market power (if any) of the large developed countries. And it
is very difﬁcult to design ‘strategic trade’ policies associated with imperfect competition in a world as
dominated by rapid technological progress and economic change as the current world is.
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The climate community does not have such a luxury. Climate policies consist of
imposing taxes or of introducing prices in order to take into account a public good
which has so far been ignored. Indeed, it should be recognized that climate
negotiations are moving surprisingly far towards price-based measures (tax or cap-
and-trade mechanisms) relative to command and control –making it easier to draw
a parallel with the trade regime. Such tools do not look friendly to businesses and
consumers, though there are ways to soften this perception.7 Moreover, as it is not
yet known what level of tax (or price) would ensure that the world global tem-
perature would not increase by more than 2 degrees Celsius, the climate community
has to create mechanisms to progressively reveal such a level, a very difﬁcult
process.
That said, positive forces are also emerging in the climate context. A rising
number of ﬁrms are investing in products targeting climate-driven demands. Some
countries (Germany, Sweden, but also China or India) are increasingly behaving as
if they have positive economic interests in a world climate regime. A concrete illus-
tration of these forces is emerging in the negotiations on a complete liberalization of
trade in environmental goods in the Doha Round. If these negotiations are bogged
down by disagreements on the list of such goods, it partly reﬂects the fact that the
process is only beginning, and hence that there is not yet a wide enough scope of
interests. Eliminating tariffs on such equipment and products would make for more
affordable climate policies in the emerging and developing countries.
Still a multilateral world – not yet ‘one world’
The 2009 Copenhagen Conference made it clear that the ideal mechanism of a
negotiated world tax (Cooper, 2008) or price (Cramton and Stoft, 2009) is very far
away. The annexes to the Copenhagen Accord show that countries are not even
capable of deﬁning their commitments in identical terms (same base and target
years, same criteria for measuring emission cuts, etc.).
What may be within reach is thus a multilateral regime supporting national
carbon policies. As mentioned above, such a regime is not without beneﬁts to the
extent that it allows ‘willing’ countries to take the lead and go ahead. But these
countries may also be tempted to take extraterritorial action by deﬁning the climate
norms to be enforced by their partners, as most recently illustrated by the EC
Renewable Energy Directive (Schaus and Lendle, 2010). A truly multilateral system
and individual extraterritorial action are hardly compatible.
This paper thus assumes a truly multilateral regime disciplining national policies:
each country imposes its own carbon tax(es) on its domestic emitters, and it takes
the climate policies of its partners as given – exactly as it deﬁnes its own trade and
ﬁscal policy and takes the trade and ﬁscal policies of its partners as given. Again,
7 Some carbon tax schemes (such as the existing Swiss scheme or the proposed French scheme) use
income tax rebates to compensate (or even more than compensate) for the income effect of carbon taxes.
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this assumption is adopted for reality’s sake (a uniform carbon tax would be
optimal), but, as argued below, it does not exclude the possibility of converging
national taxes towards the optimal level.
The paper focuses on the mechanism of carbon tax, not of price or cap-
and-trade. The main reason for adopting such an approach is convenience (since
carbon taxes and tariffs on imports are very similar from a legal and economic
point of view, legal and conceptual problems are minimized). That said, it is
interesting to note that one of the most recent climate policies (that of Australia) is
based on a carbon tax for a transitional period preparing for the introduction of a
cap-and-trade system, that the duration of this transitional period has not as yet
been deﬁned, and that the conditions for the shift to the cap-and-trade system are
also not yet deﬁned.
In such a context, the ﬁrst key question is: what are the provisions that have been
the source of the success of the trade regime and that are absent in the Copenhagen
Accord? The answers are ‘national treatment’ and ‘most-favoured nation’.
2. National treatment: a robust framework for carbon border taxes
In 1947, the GATT did not impose the principle of free trade; it was then (and still
is) as far out of political reach as a world carbon tax (price) is today. It deﬁned two
principles that were more politically acceptable and yet economically sound. The
ﬁrst is ‘national treatment’ (NT):
. a country should impose the same domestic tax(es) on imported goods and on like
products produced domestically (GATT Article III);
. any country violating this rule can be exposed to compensation or retaliation by
all the GATT/WTO Members concerned.
This principle has created a level playing ﬁeld between foreign and domestic
products credible enough for trade to ﬂourish at an astounding rate during the last
60 years. Transposing the NT principle into the climate regime would ensure the
same level playing ﬁeld. But it also raises serious implementation issues which need
careful examination.
The NT principle, taxation and world trade
The NT principle addresses the major concern of the climate community – the fear
that trade rules will inhibit the development of stricter climate policies in countries
willing to move ahead.
This key point can be illustrated by what has happened in ﬁscal policies. During
the last 60 years, the NT principle has allowed the multilateral trade regime to
thrive in a world where different national indirect tax rates have been the rule
rather than the exception, as best illustrated by the European Community (EC)
with its huge internal trade and many different rates of value-added tax (VAT) in
the various EC Member States. Interestingly enough, the current debate on climate
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and trade largely echoes the debate raging in the 1970s in the United States after the
adoption of VAT by the EC Member States.8
Managing trade and ﬁscal policies has required a combination of the NT rule
with the principle of applying the taxation of the country of destination (see the
review by Horn and Mavroidis, 2010).9 The latter states that when country A does
not impose the same tax on a given product as country B, the domestic tax imposed
by country A on its product should be removed when the product is exported to
country B, and replaced by the domestic tax of country B, once the good has
entered the country B market. Simultaneously, a ‘border tax adjustment’ (hereafter,
border tax, for simplicity’s sake) is also applied to products exported from country
B to country A. VAT-related border taxes have been the routine procedure to cope
with differences in indirect taxes between trading partners for the last three
decades.
The NT principle and the climate regime
Transposing the ‘VAT-type’ procedure into the climate context thus imposes two
obligations on every country. First, when exporting goods, the country should
eliminate its domestic carbon taxes (if any) on the exported products. Second, when
importing goods, the country should impose its own domestic carbon tax on the
imported products (free of the carbon tax imposed by the exporting country).
This procedure deserves several remarks. First, choosing the appropriate tax
rate – a key step in this procedure – requires that the domestically produced and
foreign goods are ‘similar’ (or ‘like’). Deﬁning ‘similarity’ has always been a source
of serious problems in trade policy. Economic analysis links similarity to price
cross-elasticities and relevant markets. Such a view has never prevailed in the trade
policy context where similarity is generally deﬁned on arbitrary grounds: two
goods are similar if they pertain to the same tariff line, or if they share some precise
technical feature, or if they are perceived as similar by the consumers, etc. (Horn
and Mavroidis, 2008). In the climate context, these problems are ampliﬁed by the
fact that similarity involves not only the good per se but also its process of pro-
duction (some processes for producing a good can be more carbon-intensive than
others). This point is so important that the end of this section returns to it.
Second, the VAT-type procedure allows a key distinction to be made between
VAT-type carbon border taxes (BTs, for short, in what follows) and ‘carbon
tariffs’ – a distinction generally ignored in the current literature. Viewed from an
8 Some US policy circles still believe that European VATs constitute an export subsidy despite robust
economic analysis accumulated over several decades (for instance, see Rufﬁn, 1979; Hufbauer and
Gabyzon, 1996).
9 Interestingly, the Kyoto Protocol is based on the principle of the country of origin (not of destination).
Such a principle has the advantage of avoiding a need for border tax adjustments. But it is at the cost of
requiring a level of trust among sovereign countries that does not exist in the current world. As it does not
avoid some risk of leakages, it is not inherently superior to the principle of the country of destination.
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import perspective, BTs subject goods from all origins (foreign and domestic) to the
carbon tax prevailing in the country of consumption. By contrast, the current
proposals for carbon tariffs would generally impose them only on products
imported from ‘some’ foreign countries qualiﬁed as ‘non-conforming’. Hence,
carbon tariffs are discriminatory in two respects: between imports of different
origin (some of them will be subjected to carbon tariffs, some not) and between
domestic products and imports from the targeted countries (because the level of the
carbon tariff is generally unspeciﬁed). Section 3 examines carbon tariffs in detail,
and concludes that they should be banned for the sake of climate goals.
Third, viewed from an export perspective, BTs require the elimination of the
domestic carbon tax imposed on exported goods by the exporting country. This
feature is often seen by the climate community as generating the risk of keeping
‘dirty’ plants operating in a country for export purposes alone. This concern
ignores the dynamic interactions between countries’ policies. For the sake of
simplicity, let us assume that developed country A keeps some dirty domestic
output which is exported to developing country B, which is assumed to initially
impose no domestic carbon tax. Country B then has a choice between two options.
Either it can continue to impose a zero domestic carbon tax. By doing so, it keeps
an incentive for dirty production to stay in country A (and hence its size) and
creates no incentive for the ﬁrms located in country B to become cleaner, so
condemning them to facing the highest carbon border tax in country A if they want
to export to A. Or developing country B may decide to impose a domestic carbon
tax (probably lower than the tax imposed by country A, at least initially). By doing
so, it reduces the incentive for dirty production to stay in A (and hence its size),
while it sends signals to its own producers to become progressively cleaner, and so
to become eligible for a lower carbon border tax in country A. Interestingly, this
second option is likely to be attractive to large emerging economies (as already
observed in China, India, etc.) and hence may play an important role, suggesting
that the link between carbon tax and outsourcing activities is not as strong as
alleged by vested industrial interests).
A crude ﬁrst look at the burden
Before going further, it is important to check whether such an approach would
create major disruption in world economies by having a sense of the magnitude of
the carbon taxes at stake. For instance, France emitted roughly 0.37 billion tons of
CO2 in 2008. A carbon tax of 17 euros per ton (the level chosen by the French
government, which is in line with the EC cap-and-trade spot prices during the three
last years10) would bring in a total tax amount of 6.3 billion euros – less than 4% of
10 The spot price of the European Union allowances has varied between 13 and 17 euros per ton of
CO2 from mid-2009 to May 2011 (latest estimate available). For a recent comparison of the existing
similar prices in other countries, see Productivity Commission 2011.
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total VAT collected in 2008. That said, carbon is not uniformly emitted by all
sectors. Assuming that carbon-intensive sectors represent 5–10% of French GDP
and that the whole amount of carbon tax is paid by these sectors, the carbon tax
would amount to 3–6% of the value added of these sectors, compared to the
normal rate of French value-added tax of 19.6%.
Many ﬁscal reforms of such a magnitude have been undertaken in the past
without even being noticed by the world trade regime. In addition, such border
taxes will be mostly imposed on imports from developed countries, not from
emerging and developing economies, for reasons explained below (see Table 3).
In sum, the principle of a BT is thus simple and well tested. Its magnitude does
not seem to create severe problems in general – although adjustment problems will
certainly occur in some sectors and should be addressed (see below, Section 4). But
if enforcing such a regime has been relatively easy in ﬁscal matters (VAT), this is
unfortunately not the case in the climate context. What follows focuses on some
key enforcement issues.
Deﬁning carbon border taxes in an international environment
First, carbon border taxes are to be deﬁned in an international context.11 In a
closed economy, carbon domestic taxes are deﬁned in speciﬁc terms, that is, in
dollars or euros per physical unit of carbon (or any other mix of greenhouse gases).
Such a deﬁnition makes a carbon tax equivalent to a price signal, the goal sought
after.
Deﬁning carbon border taxes in an international environment is much more
complicated because it requires a consensus among very heterogeneous countries. It
has to accommodate huge differences in terms of political vision and interests in
climate matters – for instance, most poor economies value climate policies less
highly than rich economies, and some major emerging economies feel more
immediately concerned by sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions or by water shortages
than by CO2 emissions. Ignoring such differences would almost certainly lead to an
impasse in negotiations, as illustrated by the 2009 Copenhagen Conference.
Table 1 aims to illustrate the main options available. It assumes that producing
one widget in a developed (domestic) country would cost $10,000 and emit 10 tons
of carbon when the carbon tax imposed by the developed country is $60 per ton
(column 1), and that producing a similar widget in a developing (foreign) country
would cost $8,500 and emit 20 tons of carbon when the carbon tax imposed by the
developing country is $6 per ton (column 2). Finally, it is useful, for the discussion
below, to note that the ad valorem equivalent of the domestic carbon tax is 6% in
11 Interestingly, the GATT text does not deﬁne tariffs. This deﬁciency has been a source of constant
problems (particularly in agriculture) since the protectionist impact of speciﬁc tariffs can be substantially
more severe than the impact of ad valorem tariffs.
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the developed country and 1.4% in the developing country – a difference that
policy makers and negotiators will interpret as a rough indication of the cost of the
climate policy in the two economies.
Table 1 focuses on carbon border taxes. Hence, the widgets exported by the
developing country land at the border of the importing developed country at a cost
of $8,500 for all the possible options deﬁning the carbon border tax (row 4 and
columns 3 to 5). By contrast, carbon tariffs (taxes imposed by the developed
country on the price of the widget exported by the developing country, including
the carbon tax imposed by the developing country) would be imposed on an
$8,620 basis.
Three features are needed to deﬁne a carbon border tax: the nature of the tax (S if
speciﬁc, V if ad valorem), the tax rate (I if deﬁned by the tax rate of the importing
country, E if deﬁned by the tax rate of the exporting country), and the tax base (I if
deﬁned by the carbon content of the importing country, E if deﬁned by the carbon
content of the exporting country).
Combining these three features allows three main types of carbon border taxes
(BTs) to be deﬁned. Column 3 shows a BT-SIE, which is deﬁned in speciﬁc terms (S)
and which is based on the tax rate of the importing country (I) and on the carbon
content of the exporting country (E). Column 4 shows a BT-SII, which is deﬁned in
Table 1. Alternative deﬁnitions of a carbon border tax
Taxes and prices Units
Domestic
(developed)
country
Foreign
(developing)
country
Border tax deﬁnitions [a]
BT-SIE BT-SII BT-Vii
[b] [c] [d]
1 2 3 4 5
1. carbon tax $ per ton
of carbon
60 6 60 60 –
2. carbon content tons per
widget
10 20 20 10 –
3. carbon total tax per
widget
$ 600 120 1,200 600 510
4. price per widget [e] $ 10,000 8,500 8,500 8,500 8,500
5. carbon tax
(ad valorem)
% 6.0 1.4 14.1 7.1 6.0
6. price per widget [f] $ 10,600 8,620 9,700 9,100 9,010
Notes: [a] The three carbon border taxes (BTs) are imposed on the price per widget excluding the
exporting country’s carbon tax. [b] BT-SIE: BT deﬁned in speciﬁc terms (S), based on the tax rate of the
importing country (I) and on the carbon content of the exporting country (E). [c] BT-SII: BT deﬁned in
speciﬁc terms (S) and based on the tax rate and on the carbon content of importing country (I and I). [d]
BT-VII: BT deﬁned in ad valorem terms (V) and based on the tax rate and on the carbon content of
importing country (I and I). [e] Price excluding the domestic carbon tax. [f] Price including the
appropriate carbon tax.
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speciﬁc terms (S) and which is based on the tax rate of the importing country (I) and
on the carbon content of the importing country (I). Column 5 shows a BT-VII,
which is deﬁned in ad valorem terms (V) and is based on the tax rate of the
importing country (I) and on the carbon content of the importing country (I) – and
this ad valorem equivalent is applied on the price of the imported widget like a
tariff.12
Negotiating deﬁnitions in an international forum
Table 1 shows that the price of the imported product varies signiﬁcantly depending
on the deﬁnition used. As this paper focuses on international negotiations, this
result suggests that there will be serious reasons to ﬁnd a pragmatic compromise on
the deﬁnition to be adopted by the international climate regime. What follows relies
on two assumptions shaping such negotiations. First, there is a broad under-
standing among negotiators that while the climate issue requires a simultaneous
solution to an allocational problem (how many carbon emissions should be cut
every year) and a distributional problem (how to share the costs of these annual
emissions cuts), trade policy can only address the allocational problem, meaning
that appropriate transfer policies will be needed for addressing the distributional
problem. Absent this broad understanding, there is little chance that climate
negotiations could be successful. Second, what follows assumes that there is perfect
information on carbon content. This assumption will be re-examined below in
looking at the implementation problems.
Developing countries are likely to perceive the BT-SIE deﬁnition as imposing a
‘double penalty’ to the extent that their large carbon emissions reﬂect their pending
development problems (dirty production process combined with low valuation of
the climate issue). Such a view is illustrated by the ad valorem equivalent of the
BT-SIE on widgets imported from developing countries, which amounts to 14%,
compared to only 6% for the domestic carbon tax imposed on widgets produced in
developed countries. The sharper the erosion of the price advantage of their
exported widgets due to the imposition of the carbon border tax, the more vocal
developing countries’ negotiators will be.
Developing countries will ﬁnd the BT-SII and BT-VII deﬁnitions more accep-
table. They generate cost increases that are more affordable than the one generated
by the BT-SIE approach (four to ﬁve times the cost of the existing carbon tax in the
developing country compared to ten times). Table 1 illustrates a situation where the
BT-SII and the BT-VII deﬁnitions bring very similar cost increases. However, it is
easy to show that the larger the difference between the prices of domestic and
foreign widgets (row 4), the more costly the BT-SII deﬁnition compared to the
12Note that the BT-SII and BT-VII deﬁnitions are more consistent with the NT approach than the
BT-SIE deﬁnition since they rely on parameters (carbon tax and carbon content) that are entirely deﬁned by
the conditions prevailing in the importing country.
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BT-VII option.13 In short, the BT-SII approach would appear systematically biased
against the interests of the poorest countries since such countries tend to offer less
elaborate, hence cheaper, products than the rest of the developing countries.14 As a
result, the BT-VII is very likely to emerge as the preferred deﬁnition of the carbon
border tax for the developing countries.
By contrast, developed countries’ negotiators are likely to push for the BT-SIE
deﬁnition, which has the attraction of generating a ‘world’ price of CO2. But, as
has been amply demonstrated since the Copenhagen Conference, they are unlikely
to convince developing countries, for the reasons given above.
In such a context, the BT-VII deﬁnition has three features which are interesting
from the developed countries’ perspective.
First, there is nothing in the BT-VII deﬁnition to prevent a developing country
from adopting a climate policy more stringent than that of the developed countries
if the country was willing to set up such a bold climate policy and if it believed that
its comparative advantages were strong enough to sustain it.
Second, the BT-VII is a multiple (four times in Table 1) of the domestic carbon
tax imposed by the developing countries. Hence, it sends a clear signal to devel-
oping countries to start to cut their CO2 emissions – launching a process of conver-
gence among CO2 prices in the world. This ‘progressivity’ has some merit,
particularly if the alternative of imposing the BT-SIE immediately would represent
such a burden on developing economies that it had the unexpected negative
consequence of inducing developing countries to create a dual world economy –
that is, a clean economy covering developed countries and some emerging
economies’ exporters, and a dirty economy in the rest of the world. In such a case,
the net impact of the BT-SIE on the world climate regime is hard to predict. The
higher the carbon border tax imposed by developed countries, the more likely is the
emergence of such a dual world economy, with a correspondingly larger share for
the dirty economy in the world and an increasingly harmful and durable impact
on the climate (developing countries are growing much faster than developed
economies).
Lastly, it is true that BT-VII (and BT-SII) may induce the developing countries to
behave as ‘followers’, that is, to let their carbon border taxes be shaped by the
climate policy of the importing (developed) countries. This behaviour is often seen
as negative from a climate perspective, but it may be more beneﬁcial than it seems at
13 If the price of the widget produced by the developing country is $6,000 (all the other things being
constant), the ad valorem equivalents (row 5) would be 10% (column speciﬁc) and 6% (column
ad valorem).
14 Another way to deal with the poorest countries is to grant them some ‘special’ treatment (see the
conclusion of this paper). The world trade regime suggests strongly that it is extremely difﬁcult to design
special treatment that has no perverse impacts on both the beneﬁciaries and the excluded developing
countries. Moreover, special treatment does not exclude general mechanisms unbiased against the interests
of the poorest countries.
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ﬁrst glance. For instance, let us assume that there are two different production
processes for producing widgets existing in the developed country (once again, the
implementation problems raised by such a complicated system will be re-examined
below). While Table 1 illustrates a relatively carbon-intensive process, another
production process operated in the developed country would require only ﬁve tons
of carbon per widget, and so be subject to lower import-deﬁned and ad valorem-
based domestic carbon taxes (respectively $300 and 3%). Developing countries’
exporters would thus have an incentive to invest in this cleaner carbon-intensity
process in order to be classiﬁed in the same category as the cleaner process in the
developed country, and hence beneﬁt from the corresponding lower carbon border
taxes. In short, there are incentives for the developing countries to follow the most
CO2-efﬁcient process in the developed countries (in the same way as emerging
economies are induced to quickly adopt the most recent technologies).
To sum up, considerations of equity and development – not trade – suggest that
in the current international negotiations, characterized as they are by high hetero-
geneity among countries, a good compromise would be to deﬁne carbon border
taxes in ad valorem terms based on the parameters of the importing country. Of
course, all the deﬁnitions of the carbon border tax above could become acceptable
to developing countries if they were to receive appropriate transfers (up to $1,080
per widget in the case of the SIE approach) from developed countries. But nego-
tiating such transfers could impose astronomical transaction costs, and it remains
to be seen whether such transfers would be politically acceptable to the public
opinion of the developed countries.
Mutual destruction and mutual support: an illustration
Mattoo et al. (2010) provide calculations that could be used to get a sense of the
vastly different impacts of the alternative deﬁnitions of a carbon border tax. Their
results rely on a CGE model assessing the structural impacts on developing
countries from climate change and climate policies.15 The model relies on assump-
tions about climate parameters (such as the cost of future technologies, intra-fuel
substitution elasticities, carbon tax revenue recycling, etc.). The sensitivity of the
results to these assumptions is limited by the fact that the calculations made are
about changes (in trade and output) occurring in a relatively short period of
time – in 2020 following a unilateral decision taken in 2012 by the developed
(OECD) countries to cut their 2005 level of carbon emissions by 17%. It is assumed
that developing countries have no climate policy.
Mattoo et al. envisage four options (see Table 2) characterized by the trade
measure adopted (or not) by the OECD countries to accompany their emission
cuts. First, the OECD countries could take no trade measure following their
15 The CGE model used is the World Bank Environmental Impact and Sustainability Applied General
Equilibrium (Envisage) model which is calibrated with a 2004 base year.
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decision to cut emissions. Second, they could impose a tax on all their imports from
the developing countries which would be based on the carbon content in the
developing countries’ goods, in other words a BT-SIE. Third, the OECD countries
could impose a tax on all their imports from the developing countries based on the
carbon content existing in like products produced by the developed countries, in
other words a BT-SII. Finally, they could impose a BT-SII on all their imports from
the developing countries combined with a rebate on all their exports based on the
carbon content of their domestic production – an option often called an efﬁcient
border tax (EBT) since it avoids ‘double’ taxation.16
Table 2 provides four main results in terms of export ﬂows (the model provides
results for output and welfare changes as well). It gives the (percentage) changes in
exports in 2020 which would result from a hypothetical 2012 unilateral decision of
the OECD countries to cut emissions:
. The no trade measure emerges as the preferable option from the joint point of view
of climate (OECD countries do take measures to cut their CO2 emissions), trade
and development (the impact on trade ﬂows is small, as in the EBT case, but it is
milder for developing countries than in the EBT case): it illustrates mutual
support.
. A BT-SIE is clearly much more costly to almost every country than a BT-SII. This
result conﬁrms the discussion of Table 1: developing countries are likely to be
strongly opposed to a BT-SIE deﬁnition of the carbon border tax.
. By contrast, the impact of a BT-SII in terms of changes in developing countries’
exports is limited enough to induce developing countries to agree on the
Table 2. Impact in 2020 of alternative border tax regimes on industrial exports
of selected countries following a 2012 OECD unilateral cut in CO2 emissions,
percentage changes
OECD measures accompanying
the 17% cut in CO2 emissions US EC
Developing
countries Brazil China India
1. no trade measure −2.3 −2.1 −0.1 1.0 −0.9 −0.3
2. BT-SIE [a] −10.1 −23.2 −14.8 1.9 −20.8 −16.0
3. BT-SII [a] −6.5 −6.6 −3.2 −2.5 −3.4 −3.2
4. EBT [b] 0.0 0.5 −2.0 −0.6 −1.8 −2.1
Notes: Developed countries are assumed to unilaterally reduce their emissions by 17%. [a] See
deﬁnitions in Table 1. [b] The EBT (efﬁcient border tax) combines a BT-SII on all the developed
countries’ imports from the developing countries combined with a rebate on all the developed countries’
exports based on the carbon content of the production in the developed countries.
Source: Mattoo et al. (2010).
16 A tax on imports (such as BT-SII) is also a tax on exports (Lerner Symmetry theorem).
Climate and trade policies: from mutual destruction to mutual support 67
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 16 Jul 2014 IP address: 193.54.67.94
introduction of such a border tax – especially if its introduction is combined with
international transfers, and/or if developing countries are convinced that they
should adopt a climate policy.
. No trade measure and an efﬁcient border tax (EBT) have similar impacts. The
difﬁculty of implementing a complex EBT scheme suggests that the no trade
measure may well be the best policy.
Unfortunately, Mattoo et al. do not envisage the case of a BT-VII. The discussion
in the previous subsection on the relative ad valorem tax rates of a BT-SII and a
BT-VII suggests that the expected impact of a BT-VII would range somewhere
between the BT-SII case and the EBT case.
More about implementation problems: mind-boggling complexity
A key implementation problem comes from the fact that the climate community
pays a lot of attention to production processes. This attention is legitimate: what
counts is not so much the carbon content of an individual product as the whole
‘carbon footprint’ aggregating the carbon emitted at every step of the production
process of the good in question.
If this approach makes sense in the climate context, it means that perfectly similar
products are different if they have different carbon contents due to the use of
different production processes. Such a prospect has made the trade community very
nervous because of the sheer complexity generated by adding the dimension of
production processes, in particular if importers have the right to calculate the
carbon content in the supplying countries. In short, it becomes critically important
to strike the right balance between exhaustiveness and simplicity.
Today, there are roughly 10,000 different tariff lines deﬁning ‘products’ in a
typical tariff schedule. Taking into account the various production processes
capable of generating each of these products would require tariff lines to be deﬁned
in terms of ‘products times production processes times ﬁrms’. Such a challenge is
not new in the world trade regime. ‘Rules of origin’ which determine where a good
comes from or ‘export processing zones’ have created very similar problems and the
large costs involved are well documented (equivalent to a price increase of 12% in
the NAFTA case (Cadot et al., 2005)). But the climate context has an unprece-
dented capacity to generate such problems. Pushed to its extreme, it could easily
negate the notion of similar products that is so essential in a world witnessing an
endless expansion of varieties of products in order to better satisfy consumers.
The literature revealing the full extent of the problems of implementing climate
policies in an international context is relatively recent (Brenton et al., 2009; Jensen,
2009; Moore, 2010). Too many observers continue to stick to the naive solution
according to which each exporter would provide the carbon footprint of its product
to the Customs of the importing country. Such a solution faces two problems. First,
its logic would require a gigantic database ‘products times production processes
times ﬁrms’, generating astronomical transaction costs (again assuming the data
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existed). Second, costs would be compounded by the huge risks of corruption that
are inevitably associated with complexity in an international context. These risks
and costs would be (much) higher for the emerging and developing countries,
precisely the countries that should be induced to participate in a world climate
regime, not discouraged from it.
From exhaustiveness to simplicity: dealing with the ‘similarity’ issue
The full conformity of the import-deﬁned approaches (whether in speciﬁc or
ad valorem terms) with the NT principle has a last crucial consequence: in
calculating them, countries rely only on the domestic information they know best.
As a result, the huge risks of misinformation on carbon footprint are reduced
(Brenton et al., 2009; Jensen, 2009; Moore, 2010), but they are not completely
eliminated.
The remaining delicate step in terms of information is when the importing
country ‘maps’ the various production processes operated in exporting countries
onto its own domestic processes, that is, when it assesses to which of its own
production processes a foreign process is similar. This step is made easier by the fact
that developed countries (the most eager to impose carbon taxes) are likely to have
knowledge of most of, if not all, the production processes (from the dirtiest to the
cleanest) existing in the world and involved in world trade. That said, problems will
emerge because the dirtiest processes may disappear faster in developed countries
than in developing countries. In such cases, the calculated carbon border tax which
was imposed on the domestic process could still be imposed on foreign producers,
even though the domestic carbon tax is no longer imposed on domestic processes.
Incentives to be inaccurate about techniques may then increase. It will also be difﬁ-
cult to ﬁnd a satisfactory solution for the converse case –when ﬁrms in developing
countries adopt cleaner technologies faster than ﬁrms in developed countries. The
multilateral framework brieﬂy described at this end of this section will be all the
more valuable.
This ‘mapping’ exercise should be used as an opportunity to strike the best
possible balance between exhaustiveness and simplicity in order to run a manage-
able system. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine such simpliﬁcation
schemes in detail (for a recent careful analysis of the legal complexities raised by
product related and non product related production processes, see Low et al.,
2010). Only a couple of options, ideally to be combined, are brieﬂy described as a
possible basis for a workable approach.
A ﬁrst, obvious, option would be to reduce the number of products to be
subjected to strict enforcement of a carbon (domestic and border) tax to those
produced by the most carbon-intensive sectors, that is, the ones where risks of
carbon leakage may be the highest. The key question is how long such a list would
be. The EC debate shows how widely the answers can stretch. At one end of the
spectrum, experts suggest only a few sectors (aluminium, cement, some chemicals,
steel), based on their results showing limited carbon leakage (OECD, 2006;
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de Bruyn et al., 2008; Graichen et al., 2008; Gros, 2009; Hourcade et al., 2008;
Kommerskollegium, 2009; Metcalf, 2007; Monjon and Quirion, 2010). At the
other end of the spectrum, the list of sectors with an allegedly ‘signiﬁcant risk
of carbon leakage’ set up by the European Commission includes no fewer than
164 sectors or subsectors (European Commission, 2009). Section 4 explains the
reasons for such a huge difference, and why the Commission’s list massively
overestimates such risks – to the point of endangering the emergence of sound
climate policies.
A second option would be to aggregate the different processes used for
producing a product into as few a number of clusters as possible, and to consider
all the production processes included in the same cluster as having the same carbon
footprint, and hence being subject to the same carbon (domestic and border) tax.
Using the ad valorem-based deﬁnition would require the ad valorem-carbon tax to
be calculated for each domestic cluster.17 This ad valorem carbon tax would then
be applied to the imports from the rest of the world, following the same procedures
as those used today in the case of VAT adjustment.
Of course, these two options could be deﬁned by each country independently of
what the other countries decide to do. However, it would be much better, from
both a climate and a trade perspective, for these options to be deﬁned in a multi-
lateral framework; this would lead to the same list of core sectors and clusters, and
generate discipline beneﬁting from lessons arising from the WTO Agreement on
sanitary and phytosanitary measures. Such a multilateral approach makes all the
more sense because similarity in a climate context should be based on scientiﬁc
evidence.18
3. Most-favoured nation: prohibiting carbon tariffs
Article I of the General Agreement provides the second fundamental principle of the
world trade regime, the so-called ‘most-favoured nation’ (MFN):
. a country should impose the same tariff on the imports of a given good regardless
of the country of origin;
. any country violating this rule can be exposed to compensation or retaliation by
all the GATT/WTO Members concerned.
17 The tax rate is given by the ratio between the carbon domestic tax paid (based on the carbon content
of the cluster and the speciﬁc carbon tax per ton of carbon for the cluster) and the value added of the cluster
in question. An elaborate description of how such clusters could be managed is provided by Barrett (2007).
18 Indeed, the history of the VAT suggests forces for a convergence of rates, if not complete
harmonization. When VAT was introduced several decades ago, many governments embarked on complex
VAT regimes based on many VAT rates. Their intent was to favour some sectors, those they judged as
strategic, while ignoring or even penalizing the other sectors. However, the following decades have
witnessed a general movement to consolidate these many initial VAT rates into fewer and fewer rates.
Today, the number of VAT rates is limited (the ‘normal’ rate plus one or two (at most) reduced rates).
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By contrast with the NT rule, the MFN rule does not echo the immediate con-
cerns of the climate community. However, it could play a crucial role in protecting
the climate community from the high risk of climate policies being captured by
vested industrial interests trying to impose discriminatory duties on some countries
(but not on others).
Often, such duties are called ‘border taxes’ in the existing literature. But it is es-
sential to underline that they are radically different from the border taxes examined
in the previous section since they would be imposed exclusively on imports from
countries qualiﬁed as having ‘non-comparable’ climate policies or on imports from
countries ‘that are not part of a global agreement to cut carbon emissions’ (to use
the terms of the French–Italian proposal tabled on 15 April 2010).19 As a result,
this paper uses the term of carbon tariffs, as noted in the introduction.
Carbon tariffs have a feature that is undesirable from both a climate and a trade
perspective: they may distort the ranking of foreign competitors in the importing
market in ways that only loosely reﬂect climate concerns but that may be costly
from the point of view of the relative efﬁciencies of the world’s economies. (In sharp
contrast, the carbon border taxes analysed in the previous section do not modify
the ranking of foreign products since their level is independent of the country’s
origin.) Carbon tariffs may make imports from so-called ‘non-comparable’
countries more expensive than imports from other countries even if the latter are
only marginally less carbon-intensive than the former. While gains in terms of
carbon emissions may be small, losses in terms of efﬁciency may be high. This
possibility is all the more likely because the carbon tariffs currently proposed
clearly target emerging (relatively efﬁcient) economies.
Carbon tariffs reﬂect a serious misunderstanding of basic facts of climate and
trade. They assume that the targeted ‘non-conforming’ emerging economies are
exporting greater amounts of carbon-intensive products than developed (‘con-
forming’) countries. Table 3 shows that only a small share of US and EC imports of
carbon-intensive goods come from the emerging economies of China and India.
This is largely because most exports from the emerging economies still consist of
products or activities that are not very carbon-intensive, such as clothing, shoes,
assembling parts, etc.
As a result, carbon tariffs are unlikely to achieve their intended goal of
‘convincing’ the emerging economies to join a world climate policy. The same could
be said a fortiori about the threat of carbon tariffs. The debate about such threats
echoes the decades-long discussions about the efﬁciency or inefﬁciency of Section
301 of the US trade statute which ended with its relinquishment in the mid-
1990s – a de facto recognition of its failure.
19 Interestingly, the supporters of the proposal say that ‘carbon tariffs’ should respect WTO rules.
Germany criticized this idea as ‘eco-imperialism’, while popular support for such carbon tariffs does not
seem to exist (Carasco, 2010).
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Ironically, Table 3 suggests that since trade of carbon-intensive products
occurs mostly between developed countries, carbon tariffs raise trade issues
primarily among these developed countries. Such a situation could lead to two
negative developments – and it is hard to assess which would be the worst. Either
carbon tariffs might degenerate into trade conﬂicts between developed countries,
exacerbating the already substantial difﬁculties of these countries in working
together on a world climate policy, all the more so because some developed
countries are much less carbon competitive than they believe themselves to be
(Delgado, 2007). Or, alternatively, in order to avoid such conﬂicts, developed
countries might choose ‘reciprocal forgiveness’ on CO2 matters among them-
selves – but that could only be at the cost of exacerbating North–South conﬂicts on
CO2 issues.
Carbon tariffs would also, almost inevitably, exacerbate the incentives for ﬁrms
based in these countries (often subsidiaries or joint ventures of ﬁrms from
developed economies) to divert their ‘dirty’ exports away from the markets of
developed countries and towards the markets of developing countries. That would
contribute to the ‘dual’ world trade already evoked, with ‘clean’ trade centred
around the slow-growing developed economies, and ‘dirty’ trade around the fast-
growing emerging and developing countries. It is hard to see what would be the
gain from a world climate perspective.
Adopting the MFN rule would make such carbon tariffs impossible. More
generally, it would reduce the risks of adopting ‘negative incentives’ as a way to
induce countries to enforce climate policies. By the same token, the MFN rule
would induce countries with advanced climate policies to look for the positive
incentives that could persuade emerging economies to improve their climate
policies as quickly as possible.
Table 3. EC and US imports of carbon-intensive products as a share of their total
imports of these products, 2007
EC imports from US imports from
China India China India
Aluminum 1.5 0.3 6.1 0.5
Cement 18.4 4.7 18.1 8.9
Chemicals 1.5 0.6 4.9 1.8
Copper 1.3 0.2 4.9 0.2
Glass 6.3 0.4 25.1 0.4
Paper 2.0 0.1 12.4 0.3
Steel 5.8 1.4 13.8 3.4
Wood pulp 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0
Source: Kommerskollegium (2009).
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4. The climate change regime: to the rescue of the world trade regime?
This section focuses on the beneﬁts the climate community could bring to the world
trade regime if it made sound decisions.
Pressures for imposing trade barriers on top of carbon border taxes
Domestic carbon taxes are likely to impose substantial industrial adjustment on
carbon-intensive sectors. Vested industrial interests in developed countries will
argue (they already do) that they are at a severe disadvantage in global markets.
Hence, they are likely to request two types of trade barriers on top of VAT-type
border taxes. The ﬁrst is the carbon tariffs examined in Section 3. But the ‘most-
favoured nation’ principle will ban them.
The alternative type of trade barrier would consist of requests for protection
lodged by individual ﬁrms or group of ﬁrms following a conditional event allegedly
‘caused’ by the introduction of the climate change policy – such as an alleged loss
in terms of output, market share, proﬁt, or any other indicator of competitiveness.
These ‘carbon conditional measures’ (CCMs, which are not allowed under WTO
rules) differ from carbon tariffs in several respects. They are subject to legal
procedures (complaint, inquiry, causation determination, decision to impose
a CCM or not, review, etc.) quite different from those required for adopting
carbon tariffs. They also tend to focus on products, not on countries (as carbon
tariffs do).
Calculations by Mattoo et al. give a sense of the pressures that would emerge
to get CCMs in the four cases in Table 2 following an OECD decision to cut
CO2 emissions by 17% (no trade measure, BT-SIE, BT-SII, and EBT). Table 4
focuses on carbon-intensive products (those most concerned by the decision to
cut CO2 emissions), unlike Table 2 which deals with all industrial products. It
gives the percentage changes (in 2020) in imports, exports, and outputs in the US
Table 4. Impact of US and EC alternative trade measures on their imports,
exports, and output of carbon-intensive products following a 2012 OECD
unilateral cut in CO2 emissions, percentage changes
OECD measures accompanying
the 17% cut in CO2 emissions
US
imports
EC
imports
US
exports
EC
exports
US
output
EC
output
1. no trade measure 3.5 3.1 −11.6 −5.2 −4.4 −1.9
2. BT-SIE [a] −10.1 −38.7 −15.9 −21.5 −2.5 1.8
3. BT-SII [a] −4.6 −11.3 −14.1 −7.8 −3.6 −0.5
4. EBT [b] −1.1 −7.8 0.7 4.1 −0.8 1.0
Notes: [a] See Table 1 for deﬁnitions of BT-SIE and BT-SII. [b] See Table 2 for the deﬁnition of EBT.
Source: Mattoo et al. (2010).
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and EC following a decision of the OECD countries to cut their carbon emissions
by 17%.
Table 4 shows serious effects on imports and exports, particularly in the case of a
BT-SIE, with the exception of a positive effect of the EBT on exports. For instance,
the trade contraction created by a SIE border tax has a magnitude close to the trade
collapse observed during the 2008–9 crisis.
More importantly, all the regimes show the emergence of negative outputs in the
US, and, less systematically, in the EC. This result reveals the magnitude of the
pressures for getting CCMs. The US output decline may be substantial enough to
induce US carbon-intensive sectors to request trade barriers on top of VAT-type
carbon border taxes (despite a slight increase in exports and decline in imports).
The situation may look better in the EC, but probably not enough to induce EC
carbon-intensive sectors not to follow US industries’ requests, and not to argue that
they also face ‘unfair’ competition from foreign industries subject to ‘less strict’
climate change policies, and hence that they need additional trade barriers in the
form of CCMs.
CCMs: a trap for the climate (and trade) communities
Some members of the climate community have already expressed some sympathy
for CCMs. In particular, they fear that pressures on carbon-intensive processes will
induce EC-based ﬁrms to outsource their dirty plants, generating ‘carbon leakage’.
They see CCMs as a way to fend off these pressures, and hence to establish dom-
estic climate change policies more rapidly and/or ﬁrmly.
In this context, what lessons can be drawn from the trade side? The current
world trade regime has a panoply of trade instruments conditional on some kind
of ‘unfair’ event that could be used by the vested interests in carbon-intensive
sectors. GATT Articles VI and XIX allow anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and
safeguard measures to eliminate ‘unfair’ practices (dumping and subsidies) or to
bring relief in case of import ‘surges’ (safeguard). Sixty years later, an abundant
literature provides the following robust evidence on the use of these conditional
trade measures:
. The reasons supporting their use are deeply ﬂawed: few believe today that selling
cheap steel bars mirrors unfair competition from developing countries or that
increased imports of T-shirts from developing countries were an ‘unforeseeable’
event.
. Their use has been grossly distorted: such trade measures are more protective of
the ﬁrms – including foreign ﬁrms in markets prone to collusion and cartelization,
such as cement, glass, chemicals, or steel, that such conditional trade instruments
promote and nurture – than their workers.
In short, all these instruments have in ﬁne been used in a purely protectionist
manner, at huge expense to domestic taxpayers and consumers, and to the
detriment of the domestic allocation of resources and of the world trade regime.
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Should these results be taken seriously by the climate community? Table 5
gives a positive answer – sending a strong warning signal to the members of the
climate community who may be inclined to join forces with vested industrial
interests.
Table 5 provides a summarized presentation of the industrial sectors that
the European Commission is considering as being exposed to a ‘signiﬁcant risk of
carbon leakage’ (Annex A gives the detailed list). Only a handful of these sectors
(those underlined) are considered to be carbon-intensive emitters by environmental
experts. By contrast, most of the sectors the Commission is ready to include in such
a list are notable as intensive users of anti-dumping measures (a key conditional
trade instrument allowed by the GATT) during the period 1987–2010. Once
combined, these two observations show the high risk of the climate issue being
captured by long-standing protectionist interests – a conclusion that a detailed
analysis of the Commission’s full list provided in Annex A conﬁrms.
The true challenge: designing appropriate adjustment measures
The climate community should thus be wise enough to reject the use of carbon
conditional measures. But this will not be easy. CCMs will be presented as the price
to pay to get a climate change policy, just as conditional trade instruments (anti-
dumping in particular) were presented as the price to get trade liberalization. In
Table 5. The use of antidumping measures in industrial sectors with a ‘signiﬁcant
risk of carbon leakage’, as established by the European Commission
Sectors [a]
Use of anti-
dumping [d] Sectors [b]
Use of anti-
dumping [d] Sectors [c]
Use of anti-
dumping [d]
Aluminum 1 Ceramics 2 Boards 2
Cement 2 Chemicals 4 Expanded clay
Steel & iron 5 Glass 2 Manganese 2
Pulp & paper 3 Man-made ﬁbres 4
Copper Nickel
Magnesite Starch
Tyres 1 Textiles 5
Zinc 2
Notes: Sectors underlined are the ones generally considered by environmental experts as carbon intensive
sectors. [a] Sectors quoted as ‘currently being analyzed’ in 2009. [b] Sectors quoted as ‘having provided
preliminary information’ in 2009. [c] Sectors quoted as ‘having announced that they will provide
information’ in 2009. [d] The use of the anti-dumping measures during the period 1987–2010 covered
by the database ranges from 1 (between 5 and 10 cases during the whole period) to 2 (between 10 and
20 cases) to 3 (between 20 and 100 cases) to 4 (between 100 and 250 cases) to 5 (between 250 and
1,000 cases).
Source: European Commission 2009 for the list of industrial sectors; World Bank anti-dumping database
on anti-dumping cases (1987–2010).
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trade, there is now an abundant literature showing that this rhetoric does not ﬁt the
facts. After 20–30 years, conditional trade instruments are still there, reducing
trade in the markets in question. It is hard to see why things would be different in
the climate change context.
That said, rejecting CCMs does not mean that no attention should be given to the
transition period during which carbon-intensive industries will need to restructure
their activities in order to adjust to stricter climate change policies.
Rather, rejecting CCMs requires the climate community to make the necessary
effort to design much better adjustment instruments than CCMs. The climate
community should conceive instruments closely targeted on the efforts to be made
by the carbon-intensive sectors along the lines suggested by recent research (OECD,
2005; Richardson, 2009; Banks, 2010).
If the climate community succeeds in achieving such a task, it will have done a
huge service to the trade community, which might then be inspired by the
adjustment instruments designed in the climate change context, and hence could
adapt them to the trade context, ultimately getting the opportunity to abandon
(or at least to drastically reduce the use of) conditional trade measures.
Concluding remarks
There is no doubt that trade and climate change policies could be mutually
destructive. But this paper underlines the strong reasons why they can be mutually
supportive: a common problem, common foes, and common friends. Mutual
support would be much stronger if the world regimes for these two policies
followed a few common principles (National Treatment and Most-Favoured
Nation) and disciplines (adjustment policies, no conditional trade policies)
beneﬁcial to them both. In other words, the climate community should feel at
ease within the broad WTO principles. If it insists on having its own treaty, it
should make sure it builds it on the same basic principles.20 Meanwhile, the trade
community should grasp the opportunity to beneﬁt from the improved disciplines
that the climate community could design in trying to avoid the systemic failures of
the trade regime.
This key conclusion should cast the many pending problems in a more – even a
much more – positive perspective. The most pressing of these problems from this
paper’s perspective (production processes, carbon tariffs) have been examined
above. But the paper has left aside many other important reasons in favour of
mutual support that deserve full attention. Hufbauer et al. (2009) and Hufbauer
20 Since the seminal work by Esty (1994; 1996), there has been a debate on whether separate world
climate and trade regimes are needed or not. Recently, the focus of this debate has shifted to the content of
the two regimes, their legal and economic compatibility, and the broad political (‘governance’)
environment.
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and Kim (2010) provide the most complete list of these issues, and more
importantly, they offer a wide range of potential solutions. As a result, what
follows mentions only a couple of them.
The ﬁrst concerns common negotiating techniques, a point emphasized by
Antholis (2009). The climate community has already begun to negotiate on a ‘pluri-
lateral’ basis (a core of key large countries with a few more countries representing
well-deﬁned groups of small countries) which the trade community would have
been well advised to adopt for concluding the Doha Round.
The second reason is the treatment of the developing and least developed
countries. The trade regime allows ‘special and differentiated treatment’ (SDT) for
such countries. But, SDT can be best described as a trap for developing countries: it
is not generous when truly needed, and it is generally designed in such terms that it
generates perverse impacts (if any) on both the alleged beneﬁciaries and the devel-
oping countries excluded from its scope. Climate change diplomacy has come up
with a concept that echoes SDT – the ‘common but differentiated responsibility’
notion. In this respect, it will be crucial that the climate community does not
duplicate the mistakes made by the world trade regime, and realizes that the full
enforcement of the principles above takes care of this notion (Hoekman et al.,
2010).
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Annex A. The NACE list of industries with a ‘signiﬁcant risk of carbon leakage’
What follows provides the detailed list of industries with a ‘signiﬁcant risk of
carbon leakage’ published by the Commission. The NACE codes have been selected
on the basis of the quantitative criteria set out in Article 10a (13) of Directive 2003/
87/EC. The legal basis for their selection is:
. Column 1: codes based on paragraphs 15 and 16, at NACE-4 level.
. Column 2: codes based on paragraph 15, at NACE-4 level.
. Column 3: codes based on paragraph 16, point a, at NACE-4 level.
. Column 4: codes based on paragraph 16, point b, at NACE-4 level.
. Column 5: codes based on paragraphs 15 and 16, at NACE-5 and beyond level.
. Column 6: codes based on paragraphs 17, at NACE-4 level.
Letter T means that the code is considered as having a signiﬁcant risk in its entirety.
The criteria used by the European Commission to draw up this list conﬁrms the
Commission’s inability to resist protectionist pressures, leaving little doubt about
the ultimate capture of climate change policies by vested industrial interests if the
climate community is not vigilant. The drift from climate change concerns (which
should be the core ones) to trade concerns became clear when EC Directive 2003/
87 was modiﬁed by EC Directive 2009/29. These modiﬁcations included the
deﬁnition of criteria for deﬁning sectors with signiﬁcant risk of carbon leakage. The
criteria adopted deﬁned three major groups of sectors (European Commission
2009):
. Sectors with a ‘particularly high’ increase (more than 30%) in the ratio between
costs due to carbon regulations and gross value added. Clearly, this group
deserves attention from a climate change perspective. But it accounts for only two
clearly identiﬁed sectors (cement and lime) in the Commission’s list.
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. Sectors with a high trade intensity (above 30%) deﬁned as the ratio between the
sum of imports and exports and the sum of gross value added and imports.
Clearly, this group has little to do with climate change concerns – but a lot to do
with vested interests eager to use climate change for plainly protectionist purposes,
or protection for slowing down climate change policies. This group accounts for a
huge number – 117 clearly identiﬁed sectors in the Commission’s list. The fact that
sectors such as manufacture of wines (NACE 1593), clocks (NACE 3350),
bicycles (NACE 3542), or underwear (NACE 1823) pertain to the list raises
serious questions about the way the list has been established.
. Sectors with a ‘substantial’ increase (more than 5%) in the ratio between costs due
to carbon regulations and value added, and with a relatively low (more than 10%)
trade intensity (deﬁned as above). The logic of this mix of criteria is unclear. The
climate change criterion is the dominant one, but the trade threshold is so low that
it is unlikely to bite seriously. This group accounts for 11 clearly identiﬁed sectors
in the Commission’s list.
Note
A supplementary table accompanying this paper is available online at http://journals.
cambridge.org/wtr
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